The future of UK relations with China
Press coverage
Financial Times (exclusive): Tory group in push for watchdog to counter Chinese interference
Newsweek: Conservative Lawmakers Demand China Watchdog to Oversee Beijing's Activity in U.K.
Mail: Time to get get tough on China investment, says UK expert
National Post: John Ivison: Report on 'values war' with China deserves close look from Canadian policy-makers
Not Cold War, But A Values War; Not Decoupling, But Some Divergence
This report outlines why the UK must recognise a fundamental difference over values with China, and also sets out five key recommendations which require urgent attention from the UK government.
Back in February a speaker at a conference threw out the challenge of finding a two word phrase to encapsulate dealings with a rising China, a phrase as punchy and descriptive as ‘the Cold War’, which characterised the second half of the 20th century. To laughter, someone suggested ‘Golden Era’ - to be fair to Osborne/Cameron, their aim was laudable, even if their understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was weak. To date, the best I can come up with is ‘Values War’.
George Orwell’s 1945 coinage ‘Cold War’ worked well for the relationship with the USSR. It was short and captured the essence. But it cannot be transferred to 21st century China. Leninist though CCP rule may be, it has made China a power with whom we have close dealings and seek good relations, whether in trade and investment, science and technology, or as an important player in climate change, pollution, health and other global challenges. The USSR was none of these; an antagonistic relationship came without detriment to our wider interests.
But first, some ground-clearing. The term ‘the West’ is outmoded. The boundaries are more fluid than NATO versus Warsaw Pact. We should instead talk of ‘the like-minded (democracies)’. It is also important to remember that we should distinguish between the CCP and the long-suffering Chinese people, a distinction whose reality infuriates the Party. 1
We have no interest in ordaining the political system which governs China. That is for the Chinese people to decide. But, as fellow humans, we do expect the CCP to abide by values enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in whose drawing up, incidentally, two Chinese diplomats played a large part (an awkward fact for the CCP, which claims that Chinese values are, and always have been, different from ‘universal values’ 2 . The democracy of Taiwan and the relative freedoms of Hong Kong are a similar reminder of this specious argument). We do expect the CCP to respect the values in various UN covenants on civil, political, economic and other rights, which it has signed. These are also reflected in freedoms laid down in the China’s own constitution - and routinely flouted.
The idea of a Values War comes as no surprise to those who study the CCP, but it has met some scepticism from the less China-literate, some of whose vested interests perhaps interfere with their vision. Thus, it is important to take not my word for it, but to listen to what Xi Jinping himself says.
On the ‘values’ part of a Values War, Xi has been consistent, both in advancing what he terms ‘socialist core values’ and in attacking what the Party calls western values. There is hardly a speech or document which does not refer to ‘socialist core values’. These have been listed as twelve under three heading, national, social, and individual values (examples are democracy, justice or and integrity) 3. But behind these unremarkable words, definition is all. What ‘socialist core values’ really means is ‘Party core values’, or values at whose core is the Party’s version of socialism. They are designed and defined to bolster the CCP canon, of which the most important element is the ‘two protects’: “maintain Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and uphold the Central Committee’s authority and its centralized, unified leadership” 4 .
That the CCP claims different values is clear from documents put out by the CCP. The most notorious is ‘Document no. 9’ of April 2013, which lists seven ‘don’t speaks’ (see box) 5 . The first five reject the pillars which hold up our democratic political and civil institutions. A further example among many is ‘Document no. 30’ 6 put out a year later, which bans the teaching of liberal ideals in universities. Perhaps the most comprehensive is the ‘Outline of Patriotic Education for the New Era’ 7 , which was promulgated in November 2019 and is in effect Xi’s blueprint for totalitarianism.
Seven ‘don’t speaks’
1. Western-style constitutional democracy, meaning a separation of powers, a multi-party system, contested national elections and an independent judiciary. This is an attempt to undermine the CCP leadership and its “socialism with Chinese characteristics” governance system.
2. Western values, claiming to be “universal”. This is an attempt to weaken the CCP’s theoretical foundations.
3. Civil society, and the idea that individual rights must be respected by the state. This is an attempt to dismantle the CCP’s social foundations.
4. Neoliberalism, ie unrestrained freemarket economics, total privatisation and liberalisation. This is an attempt to change China’s economic system.
5. Western-style journalism, challenging CCP discipline in media and publishing.
6. Historical nihilism, for example denying the value of Mao’s legacy; and
7. Questioning the regime’s socialist credentials.
As for the ‘war’ part of the Values War, here too Xi is clear, even if, when he speaks at international fora, he trots out the tired tropes of ‘win-win’ or ‘community of shared future for mankind’. Internally, his message is very different. Few documents are not garnished with the threat of ‘hostile foreign forces’. In his first speech to the Politburo in January 2013, he said:
“Most importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on . . . building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.”
The word most often used by Xi is not ‘war’, but ‘struggle’, douzheng 斗争in Chinese, a word which conveys a long and hard fight. (It has to be said that ‘struggle’ is a better description, but ‘Values Struggle’ in English sounds odd.)
Those who doubt even Xi Jinping’s words should look at his actions. Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, the five year old campaign against human rights lawyers, the ‘Police Cloud’ system of technological surveillance and repression, the sacking of academics, arrest of priests, control of free speech…. the list goes on.
This Values War seeps into all fields: economic and trade (security issues aside, is it, for example, right to work closely with Huawei - a company which has three joint laboratories with public security bureaus in Xinjiang and boasts of its contribution there to modern policing? 9 What are the reputational risks and how do they differ from cooperation with Putin connected Russian companies or Apartheid South Africa?), into cultural, educational, media, legal exchanges. It is patently incompatible with the concept of a ‘Golden Era’.
We need to recognise that there is a Values War, whether we like it or not. Xi is clear; so must we be. At the same time recognising reality does not mean our politicians parading it whenever they deal with China. They should take a leaf out of the CCP book: Party leaders are adept at adding lashings of butter to their externally directed rhetoric, even as internally they talk of ‘hostile foreign forces’.
The D Word: Divergence, Not Decoupling
We shall see after the elections whether in the United States D stands for ‘decoupling’, as it seems at present (the US perhaps does think of itself as entering a new Cold War). A largely bipartisan approach to China in Washington suggests that it will. The UK does not need to follow that lead, but we do have to recognise reality: D stands for ‘divergence’. That means agreeing to disagree in certain areas, while maximising cooperation in areas where interests overlap. It is implicit in the EU’s designation of China as a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. 10
Xi Jinping himself is clear on this divergence, as his first Politburo speech bears out. Nor is it confined to human rights, as Document no 9 makes clear. Politically, the CCP has strengthened its control over government and society; any experimentation with wider elections at the grassroots level, or with greater intra-Party democracy has ceased. Economically, the CCP continues to push ahead with consolidating the state-owned sector. Last month, reinforcing the autarkic industrial policy of “Made in China 2025”, a government statement called for building “a complete strategic industrial system via state planning and state investments”11. Meanwhile another decree ordained even further powers for Party cells in private companies.12 Internet sovereignty and censorship are other areas where divergence is being pushed by the Party.
The rapid emergence of new technologies pushes this divergence and brings in new threats to national security, and to long-term economic security. 5G telecommunications is just the first instance of this. Increasingly sophisticated machine learning can melt down the vast amounts of data and metadata sent back to China and forge them into instruments to give advantage13. The boundary between civil and military uses of technology are eroding. All this preceded Covid-19, which has also brought home the need to protect and diversify critical supply lines, and not just in pharmaceuticals.
Divergence is a fact. It must be carefully managed and minimised. But it must not be ignored.
Responding to Divergence - the "Holy Trinity of National Security, Long-Term Interests and Values
It is surely a truism that UK foreign policy should aim to protect our national security, long-term interests and values. The argument comes when balancing the three and when taking into account short-term factors, not least the trade and investment threat/encouragement model which underpins CCP diplomacy.
The government is currently working on a new strategy for relations with China. This is not before time: the House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee called for this in its report of April 2019 14. This year my report ‘Towards a UK Strategy and Policies for Relations with China’15 and another by Professor Rana Mitter of Oxford University and Sophia Gaston of the British Foreign Policy Group ‘After the Golden Age: Resetting UK-China Engagement’16 have put forward a number of ideas and suggestions. Reworking policy towards China will be an evolving and long term process, but four preparatory steps are important.
Firstly, the UK needs a better understanding of the CCP, its essence, motivations, strengths and weaknesses. This has both short-term and long-term implications. Government outside the FCDO lacks China literacy, particularly at senior levels (there are some good middle and junior ranking officials coming through). What expertise it does have needs to be better involved and listened to. It should also better consult outside expertise. A while back the Cabinet Office called a meeting to discuss the EU’s China strategy. There are only two officials I am aware of who have worked on or in China for the UK and the EU. Neither was invited (disclosure: I am one, and I was invited only after I heard of the meeting and suggested to a participant that I might be in a position to comment). In the longer term, the government needs to ensure more study of China and Chinese in our education system. An initiative to start an A level in Chinese civilisation, modelled on the equivalent for classics, which has enthused some students to study Latin and Greek at university, has so far failed to ignite the imagination of the Department of Education.
Secondly, the UK government needs new structures for dealing with China. In the paper ‘Rising to the China Challenge’17 (Policy Institute at King’s College), fellow authors and I discussed the need for an overarching body with full Prime Ministerial involvement and greater powers to insist upon consistent policy towards China right across government. Past flipflopping over Huawei’s involvement in our 5G eloquently makes the case. The current China National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG) should be strengthened. The government should also set up or strengthen bodies to deal with CCP interference in the UK, R&D cooperation with China, Chinese investment or purchase of hi-tech companies (see below).
Thirdly, the UK needs to be more confident in our own values and systems – and to set them in better order. One businessman urged the line that we must accept the inevitable and irresistible rise of China, take whatever we can get and be grateful18, echoing the grounds in then foreign minister Yang Jiechi’s 2010 rebuke to Singapore that, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”19 The “inevitable and irresistible rise” is CCP propaganda: I have argued elsewhere that China will not be the superpower of the 21st century and possibly not a superpower, although it will remain an important power20. CCP threats centre on limiting exports, investment, City of London financial cooperation, students and tourism. Yet none of these threats bear the weight given to them. Last time the UK was in the diplomatic doghouse (2012 after the Dalai Lama met the Prime Minister) our exports rose during the ‘freeze’21 – just as did those of Norway, South Korea, Australia and other kennelled countries; Chinese investment is not charity, and it is hard to name a greenfield site bringing substantial employment (1,800 jobs created in 2018); China needs the City’s expertise; and it is unlikely that Xi will be as effective as Covid-19 in limiting students and tourists, for fear of offending the middle classes.
Fourthly, unity of the likeminded is essential. That means working not just with the US – while avoiding being sucked into their Cold War - but coordinating more closely with other 5 Eyes allies, Japan, India, and others. And the EU. When it comes to dealing with the CCP, we cannot afford to drag in our Brexit divisions. The UK must also play a leading role in shoring up global governance bodies which embody the values agreed after WWII and forming new groupings where necessary.
Some Actions Will Not Wait
Rigorously restoring the ‘Holy Trinity’ to its rightful position is not to say that the UK should downplay its relations with China. We want to maximise mutually beneficial trade and investment, to ensure cooperation on climate change, pandemics, peacekeeping, development and other global goods. The UK is open to genuine cultural, academic and people exchanges.
But we also need to bear in mind Robert Frost’s line that “good fences make good neighbours.” It does not take the priesthood of so called ‘China experts’ to point out that, if they are not discouraged, certain CCP programmes of interference are a threat to our national security, interests and values. This United Front Work Department led strategy is by now well documented and the UK government needs to take a number of actions in the near future, which will ensure that revamped relations stand a chance of being established on firm foundations.
Five areas require immediate attention:
- Countering foreign interference generally. The UK should take a leaf out of Australia’s book and set up a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator's Office22. It should also ensure that the JSTAT (Joint State Threat Assessment Team) set up in 2017 in the Security Service looks at broader CCP interference (it so far appears to concentrate on " espionage, assassination, interference in our democracy, threats to the UK’s economic security and the UK’s people and assets overseas", which may not encompass the nature of the threat from the UFWD).23 It should also be staffed and resourced to deal with the size and nature of the problem.
- ‘Elite capture’. The phenomenon of ex-ministers and high-level civil servants leaving their posts and within weeks stepping into jobs with foreign companies for what was described by one person to me as “life-changing amounts of money” is not always compatible with the UK’s ‘Holy Trinity’. The danger is that, in anticipation of large earnings, some may promote policies or take positions which better serve the interests of potential employers rather than the UK (this is just as much a danger with, for example, defence companies as it is for state-owned/CCP controlled companies). To avoid this the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA)24 needs to revise its rules. Consideration should be given to lengthening the period before those subject to its permission may work for companies or entities where there is a risk that such work could benefit hostile powers – in some cases perhaps for as long as five years. If working as consultants, ex-politicians and civil servants should be required to clear specific projects with ACOBA, which in turn may need to consult government departments or those with the relevant expertise. Where the guidelines are flouted, ACOBA should be able to impose sanctions.
- Political lobbying. Allied to the above is the need for a more stringent oversight of political lobbying in order to ensure that hostile powers do not suborn or unduly influence our political processes. There is considerable evidence of this abroad25, and some for the UK26. Current rules need revamping, in order to increase transparency and to make clear the ultimate source of the money, which may have been channelled through a British citizen. Those engaged in lobbying should register their clients; sanctions for disregarding the guidelines should be sufficiently hard as to discourage those tempted to ignore them. Such a system would require policing, perhaps by a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator's Office.
- Technology and R&D cooperation which might help potentially hostile powers. China has a well-defined path of exploiting dual use technology. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) puts out well-tempered guidance to universities and companies on cooperating with research partners27. This gentlemanly advice (“You may wish to….”) is all well and good. Any university or company considering cooperation with Chinese partners will benefit from following it. But greater authority is needed. Universities and companies should be required to follow clear guidelines for cooperation28. This would encourage cooperation where there is mutual benefit, while preventing the risk of developing dual use technology which might strengthen a potentially hostile state or a state using surveillance and repression in contravention of UN covenants. Universities and companies should be able to turn to a government body for a swift ruling on whether cooperation is permissible in certain fields, or with certain organisations or individuals. Where these threaten UK national and allies’ security, the government should have the power to sanction those who prejudice that security, including launching prosecutions of those stealing UK intellectual property to military or repressive purposes.29 It should also exchange information with similar bodies in other like-minded countries.
- Oversight of Chinese investment in the UK. The UK has a screening mechanism for investment which might constitute a threat to national security. But it needs reworking. The government had initially undertaken to present the National Security and Infrastructure Investment Bill to Parliament in July 2020. This deadline has passed; the urgency has not. Chinese investment is increasingly focused on companies which can make good its technological shortcomings. As new technologies increasingly can be used for both benign and military or repression purposes, we need to ensure that investment does not harm our long-term security. Not only should the bill be introduced as a matter of urgency, but mechanisms need to be established to ensure that investment or mergers and acquisitions do not allow the transfer of technology which conflicts with UK security, interests and values. Policing this issue should be left neither exclusively to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, nor to defence and security departments.
Finally, there is one values issue which the UK and like-minded should grasp immediately, and that is the fate of 23 million Taiwanese, who have embraced a vibrant democracy. CCP threats of unification through force could constitute one of the biggest and most urgent attacks on global human rights. This is not a matter of ‘interference in the internal affairs of China’ (Taiwan has never been ruled by the CCP, and in its entire history has only been - nominally - controlled from Beijing for the four years of 1945-9): it is a matter of the fundamental right of humans to choose the form of their government and society. The UK government, in conjunction with others if possible, should make it clear to the CCP – in advance and quietly - that our reaction to a forceful takeover of Taiwan will be severe, including the breaking of diplomatic and trade relations. The likely reaction to this will be loud and unpleasant. But provided that we are determined, the CCP will take note, because ultimately it knows that the fallout in terms of the fall in trade and investment will cause considerable unemployment and therefore unrest on the mainland, possibly leading to a challenge to its rule.
Conclusion
Moving back from the ‘Golden Era’ to a more balanced relationship with China will involve some pain. The CCP’s instincts are to bully. Yet the readjustment must be gone through. Ultimately, as ex-Australian Prime Minister and China scholar Kevin Rudd often says, the CCP despises and takes advantage of weakness, while it respects strength.
This reset is not something which can be delayed. The government is pre-occupied with Covid and EU relations, but in the long term establishing a level playing field in trade, investment and all other areas of cooperation with China is of immense importance. The longer the delay in establishing the foundations for that relationship, the less likely that it will be able to maximise cooperation, while protecting our national security, interests and values.
Charles Parton worked for much of his 37 years as a diplomat on or in China. He has twice been an adviser to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee for its China reports. A senior associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, he writes extensively on the Chinese Communist Party and on UK relations with China. Recent papers on that theme:
Endnotes and References
1. See for example: https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/141562
2. Will, P-E (2008). The Chinese Contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1947-48.
3. For a full list and background see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_Socialist_Values
4. E.g. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202007/21/WS5f16ce4ca31083481725b1c6_6.html
5. For a succinct summary of Document no. 9 see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Document_Number_Nine
For a translation see: https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation
6. https://www.ft.com/content/95f3f866-a87e-11e4-bd17-00144feab7de
7. (In Chinese only) http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-11/12/c_1125223796.htm
8. Greer, T. (2019) “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, 31 May. https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/
9. ‘Together with the Public Security Bureau, Huawei will unlock a new era of smart policing and help build a safer, smarter society.’ https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants
12. Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era’. More digestible than the document itself is an explanation given by the vice chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. See here: http://credibletarget.net/notes/YeQing
13. For a fine exposition of this see Samantha Hoffman ‘Engineering Global Consent’: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/engineering-global-consent-chinese-communist-partys-data-driven-power-expansion
14. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/612/61202.htm
16. https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/after-the-golden-age-resetting-uk-china-engagement.html
17. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/rising-to-the-china-challenge
18. Private meeting with the author
19. https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/chinas-diplomacy-has-a-monster-in-its-closet/
20. https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/foresight-2020-challenges-facing-china
21. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7379/
22. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/stepping-australias-response-against-foreign-interference
23. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-state-threats-assessment-team
24. See ACOBA: The Business Appointment Rules for Civil Servants:
25. See Hamilton ‘Silent Invasion’ for instance in Australia, for example.
26. Hamilton and Ohlberg (2020) ‘Hidden Hand’ contains allegations relating to UK figures.
27. https://www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research
28. On 15 October Universities UK put out ‘New guidance can ensure universities protect and develop international partnerships’. This is a useful step in the right direction. Further more detailed measures able to deal with the threat posed by China are needed.
29. See ‘Brain Drain: the UK, China and the Question of Intellectual property Theft’ by Samuel Armstrong at the Henry Jackson Society for a thorough treatment of this issue and a set of recommendations for dealing with them.
Charles Parton is a senior associate fellow at RUSI and worked in or on China as a diplomat for 25 years. He writes extensively on the Chinese Communist Party and on UK relations with China.